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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
SEYMOUR THOMPSON and WENDELL 
L. THOMPSON, Co-Administrators of the 
Estate of Glenn Wendell Thompson, also 
known as Wen dell Thompson, deceased, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
ANDREW H. GRIFFITHS and wife, 
ADELINE GRIFFITHS, 
Defendants and .Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
This is an appeal by defendants Andrew H. Griffiths 
and wife, Adeline Griffiths, frmn a judgment dated 
September 22, 1958, in favor of plaintiffs quieting their 
title to a certain dry fann located sorne distance north 
and east of Clarkston, Cache County, Utah. Plaintiffs' 
complaint was in the usual fonn. Defendant Adeline 
Griffiths filed a separate answer in the nature of a dis-
clailner in which she avered that she had no interest in 
the pre1nises except only as the wife of Andrew H. 
Griffiths. Andrew H. Griffiths filed an answer in which 
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he claims a prescriptive right to travel across plaintiffs' 
premises along an established roadway, which road left 
his premises adjoining plaintiffs' premises on the east, 
crossed plaintiffs' premises in a general southwesterly 
direction to the southwest corner thereof, and entered 
a count~r highway extending in a north and south direc-
tion along the west side of plaintiffs' premises. The 
trial was to the Court sitting without a jury. The Court 
entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Decree in favor of plaintiffs and against both defend-
ants decreeing that defendants had no prescriptive right 
to travel said roadway and assessed costs against both 
defendants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Andrew H. Griffiths is the owner of 160 acres of 
land situate near the top of a mountainous area about 6 
miles north and east from the town of Clarkston, the 
residence of plaintiffs and defendants. The crest of 
this mountain terrain extends in a northerly and south-
erly direction across defendants' land in such a manner 
as to cut his farm into two tracts. 
All of the tillable land in this tract is and, during 
all times mentioned in the evidnece, has been what is 
known as a dry farm upon which defendant has grown 
dry land grain and some alfalfa. 
Because of the precipitous terrain near the summit 
it is impossible to transport grain, hay and farm mach-
inery from one tract to the other. The portion of the 
farm west of the summit consisting of about 100 acres 
slopes sharply to the west toward Clarkston which is 
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situate in the lower valley. The easterly portion con-
sisting of about 26 acres of tillable land to the east 0f 
the crest or summit slopes to the east towards towns 
located in the lower area of Cache Valley. 
Defendant reached this easterly tract by traveling 
on what is known as the Rabsten Rmid but because of 
the nature of the terrain he cannot cross over to the 
western 100 acre- tract with loads of grain_ or hay or 
heavy farm machinery. rr1he only access to this tract 
is to travel the county highway northward to the _south-
west corner of plaintiffs' land, then enter the plaintiffs' 
preinises at the southwest corner and follow the road 
in question across plaintiffs' premises and then enter 
his pren1ises at a point approxi1nately 22 rods South 
of the Northeast corner of the Southeast Quarter of the 
Northwest Quarter of Section 18. (See defendants' 
Exhibit 4, an aerial map taken by the r. S. Soil Con-
servation Office on August 7, 1946, which Exhibit shows 
the location of the Griffiths' property. The high moun-
tain crest is the dark area crossing- the same. The 
Thompson property to the west and the white line ap-
pearing thereon is the roadway in question. - See also 
Exhibit 2 being a sin1ilar aerial photograph taken Octo-
ber 9, 1937, and Exhibit 3 taken October :2~, 1953.) In 
all these exhibits the ·white line 1narking the roadway in 
question appears thereon. 
DEFENDANTS' EVIDENCE 
We shall briefly sunnnarize defendants' evidence 
with respect to the nature of this roadway and the use 
to which it was applied hy defendant, his sons, agent's 
and ernployees. 
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JESSE BUTTARS testified that he acquired the 
defendants' property in 1920, that he farmed the same 
until 1929 when he sold it to defendant, Andrew H. 
Griffiths (TR 69), that he went over the road a few 
days before the trial and it was then in substantially 
the same place and condition as when he traveled the 
road. That there were only two slight variations in the 
road made while he traveled thereon. One slight change 
was made when Wendell Thompson, the deceased, dug 
a well near his old home near the south line of his prop-
erty and a short distance to the east of his west line; 
that Thompson asked him to go a little further around 
the well which he did and then came right back into 
the road (TR 85); that this slight change was made be-
cause Thompson wanted it changed (TR 86); that he 
talked to Thompson only once about the road. He, 
Thompson, wanted to change the road along the 
Anderson fence to the south. Buttars told him he would 
consent if he, Thompson, would make that road as good 
as the present one. Thompson then went up and put in 
a day on the proposed new road. Then he said, 
''If I worked to the morning of the first 
resurrection I would never have that road as good 
as this, so you go where you were." 
He further testified that you couldn't go by way of the 
Rabsten unless you just took a team of horses and went 
up there ( r:rR 88-89). Buttars described the use he made 
of the road from 1920 to 1929 each and every year 
(TR 74-75). 
Defendant, ANDREW H. G RIFFFrHS, testified 
he purchased this property from Jesse Buttars and o b-
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tained his deed on September 4, 1929. (See Exhibit 1, 
abstract entries No. 39 and 40). When he acquired this 
property the road was there and he understood that he 
had the right to travel this road; that the road followed 
substantially the white line shown on Exhibits 2, 3, and 
4 (TR 18); that he .traveled this road each and every 
year since 1929 for all purposes incident to going from 
his home in Clarkston up to the fann, transporting 
necessary farn1 machinery and hauling his crops pro,. 
duced upon the· 1.00 acr,e tract back to Clarkston; that 
he has claimed the right to use the road at .all times; 
that about 3 years ago, and after the death of Wendell 
Thompson and after his boys took over the operation, 
was the first time he ever heard of any objection (TR 
19-20). About 15 years ago ( 1942) a flood cut ·out the 
road in one place so he moved out a little; that he 
talked to Thompson about n1aking this slight change; 
that Thon1pson said it was alright to n1ake the change, 
however, that he continue to travel along the old road 
when going down hill with a load of grain, the width of 
this change was about 50 feet wide and 300 feet long 
(TR 65-66). 
WELDON GRIFFI':I:'HS, son, age 35, was 7 years 
old when his father acquired this farn1 ( TR 61). He 
ren1ained on the fann until 1942. On cross examination 
he stated that they did not have any trouble while 
Wen dell Th01upson \nls alive ( TR 111). 
ACIL GRIFFI':I:'HS, son, age 31, worked on the 
farm until fall of 1944. Then fr01n 1946 to 1952 worked 
off and on. 'l1hat they alway8 traveled this road for 
all purposes incident to the operation of their farm 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
without any objection ,(TR 120). 
JOHN GRIFFITHS, brother of the defendant, was 
in the property when Jesse Buttars owned it, has been 
over it recently. The road is in practically the same 
location now as it was then (TR 135). 
DE .MAR GRIFFITHS, son, age 29, worked on 
farm until 1948 then left for a mission. He has operated 
the farm continously since 1953. (TR 140). About 3 
years ago was the first time he ever knew of anyone 
objecting to our traveling on the road (TR 144). 
MURLE GODFREY hauled grain from the Griffiths 
farm between 15 and 20 years ago. Hauled it over this 
road. Road in substantially same position now as when 
he hauled the grain over it. Thompson never n1ade any 
objection to his traveling over the road ( TR 155). 
We shall reserve for later discussion the evidence 
offered by plaintiffs and their witnesses. 
STArrEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The Court erred in entering judgment against 
defendant, Adeline Griffiths, and in assessing costs 
against her. 
2. The Court erred in making that part of Find-
ing No. 3 as follows: 
"The defendants, their agents and employees, 
crossed over and traveled over the above de-
scribed lands with the consent of the said Wendell 
Thompson, deceased, and the defendants, their 
agents and employees travelled over said land on 
a route and way that the Wendell Thompson, 
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deceased, indicated over which they should 
travel." 
for the reason that said Finding is not supported by any 
credible evidence. 
3. The Court erred in making that part of Finding 
No. 4 as follows : 
"So that every 2 years all of said lands were 
planted and the crops harvested and the plowing 
and harvests were made on and over the trails 
and ways traveled prior thereto." 
for the reason that said Finding is not supported by any 
credible evidence. 
4. The Court erred in n1aking Finding No. 5 and 
the whole thereof for the reason that said Finding is not 
supported by any credible evidence. 
5. The Court erred in making Finding No. 7 and 
the whole thereof for the reason that said Finding is 
not supported by any credible evidence. 
6. The Court erred in 1naking Conclusions of Law 
Nos. 1, 3, and 4 and in entering a Decree in favor of 
plaintiffs and against defendants for the reason that 
said decree is contrary to all the credible evidence in 
this case and is against law. 
ARGUlvlENT 
POINT 1. rrhe Court erred in entering judgment 
against defendant, Adeline Griffiths, and in assessing 
costs against her. 
rritle to the property is vested in the na1ne of Andrew 
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H .. Griffiths. rrhe abstract, Exhibit "1," shows that 
Adeline Griffiths never has had any vested title in this 
property. She filed an answer in which she disclaimed 
any interest in the property except only her statutory 
dower rights. There is no evidence that she ever 
travelled this road or that she ever claimed any right 
to do so. There is no evidence that she ever trespassed 
upon plaintiffs' property. How then, could the Court 
'enter judgment against her, enjoining her frmn tres-
passing· when she had never done . so nor claimed any 
right to do so. The Courf also entered judgment for 
eo,sts against her. This, we think, was clearly erroneous. 
POINTS 2 TO 6, INCLUSIVE. We think that 
Points 2 to 6 can all be discussed together. 
Appellants rely upon the case of Zollinger v. Frank, 
110 Utah 514, 175 P. 2d 714, as controlling in this case, 
wherein this court holds 
"Adverse use of away, to create a prescrip-
tive right of way, must be against the owner as 
distinguished from under the owner regardless 
of whether use is. described as peaceable, hostile, 
adverse to or acquiesced in hy servient owner." 
and the case further holds 
"Where a claimant to a right-of-way has 
shown an open and continuous use of land for the 
prescriptive period of 20 years the use will he 
presumed to have been against the owner. An 
owner of servient estate, to prevent the pre~crip­
tive easement of use has the burden of showing 
that use was under him instead of against him." 
Our reason for summarizing the defendant's evidence is 
to show that the defendant, Andrew Griffiths, proved 
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a continuous use of the roadway for more .than 20 years 
and, therefore, a presu1nption arises that such use was 
against the owner and the burden of proof was upon the 
plaintiffs to prove that the use was under the owner 
rather than against the owner. 
The evidence shows without dispute that Jesse 
Buttars acquired the Griffiths' property in 1920, that he 
farmed this land continuously each and every year and 
used the road continuously for all uses incident to his 
farming operation until September, 1929, when he sold 
the property to defendant, Andrew H. Griffiths. That 
his use was open, continuous and against the owner 
Wendell Thompson, deceased, cannot be doubted. 
Thompson recognized his right ·when he requested 
Buttars to n1ake a slight change around the well and 
also when he tried to change the road near the Anderson 
property but found it to expensive and he told Buttars 
to continue to use the road as it then existed. We con-
tend, therefore, that the necessary elements requisite to 
acquiring a prescriptive right was proved from 1920 to 
the fall of 1929. Griffiths acquired the property in 
1929. The road was there at that ti1ne and he understood 
and and believed he had the right to travel this road so 
he continued the san1e use previously n1ade by Buttars. 
When, therefore, would his use ripen into a prescriptive 
right o? We say in the year 1940. So if the evidence 
shows a use by Griffiths against the owner Thompson 
until the year 1940, then such use would ripen into a 
prescriptive right and any subsequent use from 1940 
until the date of trial would not destroy the prescriptive 
right already aequired even though there was some 
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.slight changes in the ro<:J.,d travelled after 1940. 
The Court found (Finding 3) that there existed a 
close, friendly and intimate relationship between 
Thompson ,and Griffiths. This may be true, but we 
don't understand the law to be that a feeling of enmity 
or ill ·will is necessary to acquiring a prescriptive right. 
Then the Court finds that defendants, their agents, 
etc., crossed and travelled ov.er this road with the con-
sent of Thompson and on a road that Thompson indicated 
over which they should travel. 
We contend there is no credible-_ evidence in this 
record that can sustain this finding or that .between the 
years 1920 to 1940 the road was travelled with the consent 
of Wendell Thompson as that term is defined by this 
court in the Zollinger case, supra. Of course, Thompson 
kne\v t_hey wei·e using this road but he made no objection 
to this use. He recognized their right to travel thereon. 
In analyzing this testimony these facts should be 
considered : 
A. This roadway was the only way that the 
owners _of the Griffiths land could gain access 
to the West 100 acres of the farm. It i~ ad-
mitted that they farmed this land every year 
since 1920. There is no other road by which 
they could gain access to this property. No 
one contends that there was any road leading 
frorn the East 26 acre tract over the pre-
cipitous mountain terrain. If tlwy crossed by 
this method, as vaguely suggested, there would 
certainly be evidence of a road or trail over 
and across this area which- was not farmed. 
B. That this was the onl~- road travelled hy d(~­
fendant, Andrew H. Griffiths, and Buttars is 
10 
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born out by the 3 aerial maps taken by the 
U. S. Conservation Bureau. The first one 
(Exhibit "2") was taken October 9, 1937, just 
3 years before the ripening of the prescriptive 
right. It shows by a white continuous line the 
roadway as it leaves the Griffiths property at 
the jog in his fence line and entered the county 
road at the Southwest corner of the Thompso~ 
property. The next photograph (Exhibit "4") 
was taken August 7, 1946, 6 years after the 
vesting of the prescriptive right. It shows 
the road in the same identical location. rrhe 
third photo (Exhibit "3") taken August 29, 
1953, or 13 years after the ripening of the 
prescriptive right, is not as distinct as Ex-
hibits "2" and "4", but the roadway can be seen 
along the same course. These photographs 
cannot be disputed. If there was a road, as 
shown by these photographs, then the only 
person who used the road from the old house 
to the denfendant's premises was the use made 
by defendant Griffiths and Buttars and their 
agents and servants. 
Plaintiffs' evidence does show that they used the 
road jointly with Griffiths and Buttars from its entry 
into their farm to the old house and corrals located a 
short distance to the East, but there is no evidence of 
any use by plaintiffs fr01n that point Northeasterly to 
the defendant's fanu. In fact their contention was that 
no roadway existed beyond this point, but the court 
found otherwise because the court does find that the 
defendant used the road but the court concludes that 
the use ·was under Th01npson and not against him. A 
conclusion whieh cannot be supported by the evidence. 
~rhe Zollinger ease, supra, also holds 
11 
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'"Where reeord did not support clai1n that 
defendant opened road over defendant's land for 
defendant's own use and that defendant used 
road only infrequently and then only a portion of 
it and that plaintiff used road for· entire length 
thereof at such time as he desired during pres-
criptive period, evidence failed to raise presump-
tion that use by plaintiff was permissable and 
failed to rebut presumption that use was against 
defendant." 
rrhe court also finds in Finding No. 4, 
''That each year they plowed approximately 
one-half of the land so that every 2 years all of 
the land was plowed except such land as was in 
alfalfa and every year approxin1ately one-half 
of said lands were seeded, cultivated and crops 
grown thereon which wereharvested so that every 
2 years all of said lands were planted and the 
crops harvested and the plowing and harvest were 
made on and over the trails and ways prior 
thereto." 
It seems difficult to rationalize this finding with the 
evidence. The aerial map shows a well defined road 
along the same course in 19371946 and 1953. It is true 
that in certain places at certain times plaintl.ffs, while 
plowing and planting, would cross portions of the road-
way because it was easier to do this than to farm the 
separate tracts divided by the road, but the road was 
not destroyed and defendant continued to travel. the 
same. However, most of this occurred during the last 
few years and since the death of Wendell Thompson 
which occurred r..; ovemher 19, 1947, or 7 years after the 
20 year period. 
The Court found (No. 7) that the plaintiffs have 
12 
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for many years, as a neighborly accomodation, permitted 
the defendant to travel across plaintiffs'- premises but 
that during the last 3 or 4 years and especially since the 
death of Wen dell Thompson, trouble has developed be-
tween the parties with the plaintiffs atteinpting to more 
carefully plow up old trails and so-called roadways 
which defendant has used. In other words, the Court 
recognized from this finding that the so-called inter-
ference was asserted after 1949 and not before. If we 
are correct in this contention then what n1ay have hap-
pened since 1940 would be immaterial under the doctrine 
announced by this Court in the case of Dahnken Y. George 
Romney and Sons Company, 111 Utah 471, 184 P. 2d 214, 
wherein this court at page 216, syl. 9, says 
"By assuming Romney has the right to cross 
area "C" both defendants, by their adverse use 
of segment "B" for the prescriptive period ac-
quired prescriptive easements therein, not mere 
ways of necessity which 1night ten11inate when 
the necessity no longer existed. That another 
road for travel became available to the dominant 
owners does not of itself destroy or admit to an 
abandonment of their prescriptive easements." 
See also C. J. S., paragraph 13, page 650. 
We contend that Finding X o. 5 is not supported by 
any credible evidence but that on the contrary all credible 
evidence shows that at least frmn 1920 to 1940 there was 
an adverse, hostile use of the roadway as that term has 
been defined. The plaintiff Thmnpson's evidence which 
sought to show interference was so vague both as to 
tiine and eharacter as to not be worthy of credence. For 
instance, see h~stimony of Seynwur Thompson who ad-
Initted that when Griffiths hauled out his grain he mostly 
13 
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followed the hollow right against the fence and then at 
TR 216 he finally stated 
"rrhere was no trouble until DeMor rented 
the place and this has been for the last 2 or 3 
years." 
l\Iyron Thompson, a son, stated that he knew of no 
other way Griffiths .could travel from the West side ex-
cept through "our" property and then he said there 
was no road in September of 1946. We invite the court's 
attention again to the aerial photograph which was taken 
on September 7, 1946 and which shows conclusively that 
there was a well defined road in existence at that time. 
Myron Thompson on rebuttal stated that in the latter 
part of August or the first part of September, 1946, he 
overheard a conversation between his father and 
Griffiths. It is to be noted that this wa~ 6 years after 
the prescriptive period. However, after l\iyron Thompson 
had definitely fixed the time of this conversation as 
during the latter part of August, 1946, defendants then 
proved conclusively that Andrew H. Griffiths was con-
fined to the hospital in Logan for a broken leg which 
occurred about the middle of August and that he never 
left his home until several rnonths thereafter so that he 
couldn't possibly have had any conversation at the time 
and place indicated. 
We call these matters to the court's attention for the 
reason, as we contend, the evidence of the plaintiffs in 
many respects was vague, inconclusive and some of it 
not worthy of belief and we think it falls short of over-
coming the presumption heretofore referred to as an-
nounced in the Zollinger case. 
14 
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If we are correct in our analysis of the findings, 
then it must follow that the conclusions of law and the 
decree cannot find support in the evidence and that they 
are against the law. We contend the judgment of the 
trial court should be reversed and findlngs entered in 
favor of defendant Andrew H. Griffiths establishing 
his prescriptive right to travel the roadway in question. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LeRoy B. Young, of 
YOUNG, THATCHER & GLASMANN 
Attorneys for Appellants 
15 
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